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Abstract 
 
 
 
In this paper we provide a description of secondary buy-outs mechanisms, and their 
evolution in regards to first round buy-outs. While some additional motives are 
identified, introducing the possibility of performance improvement through the change 
in ownership structure, we analyse the evolution of some performance indicators. We 
scanned a 6,633 UK secondary buy-outs database between 2000 and August 2010, as to 
identify a 108-exited secondary buy-out sample (2000-2009 period). We find conclusive 
evidence that operating performance, profitability and return on investment changes 
from first round buy-outs to secondary buy-outs are negative. However secondary buy-
outs still out-perform industry peers. Positive influence of private equity backing 
remains in secondary buy-outs. Nevertheless similar impact of private equity 
syndication is limited Ȃ it only seems to significantly increase resort to leverage. We also 
identified Ȃ in a limited extent Ȃ the negative first round buy-ǯ 
and the positive secondary buy-ǯ     -outs 
performance indicator. This suggests that exit through secondary buy-outs only takes 
place if neither flotation nor trade sale are possible. In addition, the more time allowed 
for secondary buy-out mechanisms implementation, the greater operating performance 
and profitability improvements.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout practical and academic research conducted during the 80s and 90s Ȃ corresponding 
to the first wave of buy-outs Ȃ a good understanding of buy-outs motives and mechanisms has 
been developed. Exits from such ownership structures present different alternatives. While in 
past decades, secondary buy-outs were considered an exit opportunity to distressed first round 
buy-outs, such perceptions have evolved. In the last decade, resorts to secondary buy-outs were 
much more frequent, creating a true enthusiasm towards this new exit alternative. Many 
interrogations were raised on new determinants to such ownership structure; however the 
understanding of secondary buy-outs motives is still limited. 
This paper will present secondary buy-outs motives and mechanisms, as well as to what extent 
they differ from first-round buy-outs. Indeed, some motives are strengthen through the change 
in ownership enabling secondary buy-outs managerial team to take advantage of these 
additional ǯǤ
of our 108 UK exited secondary buy-outs, we wish to measure the change in performance 
indicator from first round buy-outs to secondary buy-outs. Performance indicators computed 
are regrouped into six categories: leverage, operating efficiency, profitability, return on 
investment, liquidity and solvency. We then assess the impacts first round buy-out length, 
secondary buy-out length, private equity backing and syndication Ȃ have on secondary buy-outs 
performance in regards to their industry peers. 
The paper is organized as follows. A description of buy-outs and secondary buy-outs; our 
literature review, theories and hypothesis; our data; our methodology; our univariate and 
multivariate analysis; and finally the conclusions we reached. 
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BUY-OUTS AND SECONDARY BUY-OUTS DESCRIPTION 
 
Considering the limited literature on secondary buy-outs and their recent development, many 
questioning regarding their functioning have been raised. 
 
Secondary buy-outs offer a new ownership structure including, typically, a new set of private 
equity financiers while the original financiers and possibly some of the management exit 
(Cumming et al., 2007).  While successful deals were exited though flotation and trade sale, 
secondary buy-outs were limited to some distressed transactions exits. However in the five 
years up to the collapse of the buy-outs market, private equity investors have increasingly 
sought exit by selling initial buy-outs to other private equity firms in secondary leveraged 
buyouts (Bonini, 2010). According to Bonini, the total volume of secondary buy-outs has 
increased over 10 times with diminishing equity contribution and debt cost. 
 
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) as well as Jelic and Wright (2009) identified the rate of return 
of the different exit alternatives. The first study treated 321 UK buyouts exited between 1995 
and 2004 and found out that buy-outs exited though flotation procured an internal rate of return 
of 137%, way ahead of trade sales (23%) and secondary buy-outs (10.5%). Jelic and Wright 
(2009) analysis of UK 1,225 buy-outs during 1980-2004, identified that exited via flotation 
earned 42% and also clearly outperformed trade sale (24%) and secondary management buy-
outs (23%).  
 
Secondary buy-outs brought an additional exit opportunity to private equity firms. Offering a 
middle range alternative below the traditional and strived flotation or trade sale (Bygrave et al., 
1994). Empirical analysis clearly identified flotation and the sale to a third party Ȃ trade sale Ȃ as 
the preferred exit alternatives from buy-outs and buy-ins (Robbie and Wright, 1996, Wright et 
al., 1993) Ȃ evident from results previously presented. The ideal exit plan would be for 
successful firms to exit by flotation or trade sale after 3 to 5 years of buy-out. As, after that time, 
they apparently are the most attractive to stock markets and large corporate investors ȋ  Ǥǡ  ? ? ? ?Ǣ   Ǥǡ  ? ? ? ?ȌǤ    ǯ initial 
decisions, which are likely to prefer those firms as they are expected to meet their target rate of 
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return within a given time horizon (MacMillan et al., 1987; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Wright and 
Robbie, 1996). However such ideal exits only represent a limited proportion of the exits routes. 
Explaining why, even if usually agreed before the deal has been carried out, venture capital firms 
tend to be flexible about their exit route; keeping it under review as the company develops 
(Relander et a., 1994).  
 	ǯ            
return on investment (Jensen 1989). Returns of investment from their portfolio of companies is ǯǯreputation (Barry et Al. 1990; Cumming 
and MacIntosh, 2003; Das et al., 2003). Their reputations based on returns obtained are their 
major argument to raise capital for subsequent funds.  
 ǯ, it may even unable it. 
In this situation, venture capital investor would not be able to respect their schedule, postponing 
the exit date. This delay would be explained by the unattractiveness of the company to external 
investors and consequently the impossibility to introduce the firm on stock markets and/or to 
sell it to a third party for a desired price. It is in such circumstances, especially when venture 
capital investors face time pressure, that secondary buy-out demonstrated their advantages. 
Indeed, private equity and venture capital funds as closed-end funds, beneficiate from a limited  Ǥ 	ǯ  ǡ   ǡ      
their limited partners. Secondary buy-outs give managers the possibilit   ǯ
remaining ownership shares in companies that have not reach their maximum potential and still 
present growth, value or strategic opportunities to external investors. An interesting issue 
developed by Wright, Robbie and Albringhton (2000) concerns the reasons why other venture 
capitalist will be attracted to investing in companies from which the initial venture capitalist is 
exiting. They quote the asymmetric information argument introduced by Admati and Pfleiderer 
(1994), which states that venture capitalist investors will be suspicious of the motives of others 
venture capitalists whishing to sell.   
 
Wright, Robbie, and Albrighton (2000), through empirical analysis of 182 UK secondary buy-
outs, found out that the average age, at which first buy-outs became secondary deals, was a little 
over 6 years. Secondary buy-outs average occurs 30 months after floats and two years after 
trade sales would be expected. These results support the idea that secondary buy-outs and buy-
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ins often happen when alternatives preferred exits are not possible. Statement supported by the ǯǤ 
 
Regarding the private equity team, secondary buy-out transactions involve a whole, partial or 
inexistent change of this latter. An often-observed change is when part of or the complete 
venture capital investors exit the investment as they are seeking to beneficiate from an 
immediate return on investment. In such a situation, subsequent or additional investors will be 
welcome to participate into the firm financing, creating a new buy-out Ȃ called secondary 
management buy-out. Similar change could be applied concomitantly to the management team. 
This latter situation, most of the time, takes place when venture capital investors are ǯǤ
However managers may also resign from their responsibilities or exit for other personal reasons 
and leave with the value created though their efforts. Such changes usually lead to the 
restructuring of financial structures and the resulting incentives. Secondary buy-outs and buy-
ins may also be implemented if the company needs subsequent round of financing to sustain its 
growth. 
 
Private equity investors usually wish to exit their investment as soon as possible or at least at 
the first return satisfying opportunity. While the management team often shares such return 
oriented concerns, they may better serve their interests though a secondary buy-out. In truth, 
remaining a private firm enable managers to elude from the scrutiny of stock markets 
authorities and reduce the threats of takeovers. It would in the same time enable managers to 
save time writing reports for shareholders and authorities; time they could fully allocate to 
serve the firm at its best, and in an indirect manner, their own interests. Remaining private may     ǯ  ǡ      Ǥ ǡ
flotation or trade sale are usually assimilated to large reorganisation of the tier-one senior 
management team, or at least the CEO.  Petty et al (1994) corroborate this theory to evidence 
from US entrepreneurial ventures. While trade sales may provide satisfying cash returns to the   ǡ     ǯ      
independent business. Secondary buy-outs may only be an appealing exit for the second-tier 
management team who wish to replace the former tier-one team once they exited. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORIES AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
PERFORMANCE, PROFITABILITY AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT OF 
SECONDARY BUY-OUTS COMPARED TO THEIR FIRST BUY-OUT ROUND 
 
The usual belief is that first round buy-ǲǳ from the firm, leaving 
no possible performance or value improvement to the secondary buy-out investors. However some 
arguments tend to challenge this belief, introducing additional motives potentially contributing to 
secondary buy-outs performance improvement in regards to their first round buy-outs. I will first 
present motives to regular buy-outs. 
 
According to Jensen (1986, 1988), buyouts combine several powerful incentives that increase 
efficiency and value. These policies include debt obligation due to leverage, active investors and ǡǯǤ free 
cash flow theory, Jensen rationalises leveraged buy-outs and their effects on corporate 
governance mechanisms. Leverage buy-outs indeed tend to reduce agency costs and increase 
firm value though improved operating efficiency (Jensen, 1986; Kaplan, 1989a; Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2009). 
 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
The very well known motive for the purchase of a firm by a private equity company is the possibility 
to highly leverage the deal. Leverage and its large resort to debt reduce the share of equity. Investors, 
regrouping both the private equity fund and the management team, would not have been able to take 
control of the firm if the deal was not, in majority, financed via debt. Logically, resort to leveraged 
buy-outs is negatively correlated to costs of debt. Private equity investors take advantage of cheap 
access to debt to purchase firms and materialise buy-outs. Thought this method, investors are granted 
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large funds in order to, in a first time, acquire the firm and then invest into it as to take advantage of 
growth opportunities.  
 
The leverage of the transaction has couples of indirect influences on governance and incentives that 
we present in the following parts. 
 
 
ALIGNEMENT OF INTEREST AND INVESTORS MONITORING 
 
Agency cost reduction is enabled though the alignment of managers interests to their investors. In 
truth, in a firm, managers could be tempted to serve their own interests, investing in many projects ± 
whatever their net present value ± as to increase their compensation and establish their personal 
UHSXWDWLRQ WKHVH ODWWHU EHLQJ SRVLWLYHO\ FRUUHODWHG WR ILUP¶V VL]H -HQVHQ  +RZHYHU VXFK
situations are most of the time and thanks to governance policies, banned from the private equity 
landscape. Such alignments of interests are enabled by the management equity ownership increase 
RQFHWKHDFTXLVLWLRQLVFRPSOHWHG,QGHHGWKHOHYHUDJHRIWKHWUDQVDFWLRQFRQFHQWUDWHLQYHVWRUV¶HTXLW\
ownership, and management share is strengthened thought the deal completion. While, according to 
the agency theory, the free rider attitude (Kosnik, 1990) is observed though managers opportunism 
enabled by the diffused ownership of public corporations (Zahra, 1995), taking the firm private will 
concentrate the ownership and unable executives temptations to control the company. Due to their 
equity ownership and their compensations being positively correlated to long-term performance, 
PDQDJHUV¶FRQFHUQVDERXW WKHFRPSDQ\¶VVWUDWHJ\ZLOOEHVLPLODUWRSULYDWHHTXLW\LQYHVWRUV,QGHHG
³UHVHDUFKVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHSULPDU\VRXUFHRI>«@ (post-leverage buy-out) gains is new value created 
WKURXJKVLJQLILFDQWRSHUDWLQJSHUIRUPDQFHLPSURYHPHQWV´3DOHSX Managers will, then, prefer 
long-term value creating projects as to maximise the company value; they will therefore invest in 
³FUHDWLQJQHZEXVLQHVV6HWKDQG(DVWHUZRRGDGRSWLQJQHZFRPSHWLWLYHVWUDWHJLHV%DNHUDG
Wruck, 1989), and increasing their comSDQ\¶VRYHUDOOFRUSRUDWHHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS´=DKUD6$ 
 
In addition, concentrated ownership enables private equity investors to seat and control the 
board of directors, which gives them the ability to monitor the management team and control 
the buy-ǯǤ      ǯ   ǯǤ  ǡ 
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secondary buy-outs, private equity investors share of ownership tends to decrease to the ǡǡǯ-
monitoring due to their stronger alignment of interests should balance this loss.  
 
Even considering the probable effects of the incentives argument (Jensen), challenging economic 
forecast concerning the influence of change in leverage as well as the influence in managerial equity 
have to be considered. For example, as illustrated by +RWKDXVHQDQG/DUFNHU³while increased 
managerial ownership of the firm's common equity could increase financial performance because the 
key officers have a greater stake in any value-increasing actions that are taken (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), it is also possible that increased managerial ownership could decrease financial performance 
due to managerial risk aversion and the potential underdiversification of the managers' wealth (Fama 
DQG-HQVHQ0RUFN6KOHLIHUDQG9LVKQ\´7KHQGXHWRWKHPDQDJLQJWHDPULVNDYHUVLRQ
executives might only consider part of the projects, preferring safer but less profitable investments to 
risky ones. In such case, once reached a certain percentage of managerial equity ownership, increase 
in performance should stagnate and even decrease. However +RWKDXVHQDQG/DUFNHUµV(1996) results 
are consistent with most academics (i.e., Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Wruck (1989)) to the 
extent that equity ownership is positively correlated with performance. Though, managerial equity 
ownership additional increase in secondary buy-outs may reach a turning point where positive 
correlation could be reversed. 
 
 
DEBT 
 
We have seen that buy-outs would not have been completed without banks contributions.  ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡrket, of sources 
of financing, has been criticised in many ways. It appears that debt financing has impacts on Ǥǲ
of ownership ad control, especially when debt holders are concentrated or when the debt is used ȋǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍǳȋǡ  ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
use of large debt financing to leverage the deal has a direct influence to the post-buy-out ǯǤirm must indeed pay interests payment as well as repay the principal 
in order to serve the debt. As the leverage is high, debt repayment will represent a significant 
proportion of the free cash flows generated. The financial pressure brought upon the firm and its 
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management team will motive the organisation to become more efficient, as an inability to serve ǯǤǡ
by the management team; they should, as long as the debt needs to be served, prefer cash flow 
generating projects to value creating projects. Indeed, after the leverage buy-out completion, 
cash-flow maximisation should be preferred to earning increase (Easterwood et al., 1989) 
 
Due to the large debt used to finance the transaction, managers must employ the organisation to 
repay the debt and its interests, the latter being deductible from taxes. Considering the 
significance of the debt and its interests, the company beneficiates from major tax savings. This 
motive has already been referred as the value transfer from government  (Kaplan, 1989b; Davis et 
al. 2008; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Debt increases can create wealth transfers from taxpayers 
and bondholders to shareholders (Jensen and Smith, 1985). Lowenstein (1985) identified post-
buy-outs tax savings as the major source of value in this kind of deals. Due to the large debt 
contracted and the high interests it involves, buy-outs create a tax shield generating large cash-
flows.  
 
It seems that academics possess a limited knowledge of lenders behaviour towards multiple 
buy-outs and buy-ins rounds of financing, while debtors have a significant influence on private 
equity deals. Bonini (2010) identified two different ways to interpret the situation: ³On one 
hand, lenders may feel comfortable in providing financing to a second round buyer after a successful 
first-round deal for an information advantage argument: since they know well the company and its 
cash-flow potential, providing additional financing is a less risky alternative; on the other hand 
WKRXJKVHFRQGURXQGGHDOVPD\EHPRUHVXEMHFWWRWKHWDUJHWFRPSDQ\¶VFDVKIORZYRODWLOLW\LIYDOXH
creation is limited or absent, and increasingly so if entry multiples for secondary buyer are 
significantly higher than those for first round investors. ». Both of these possibilities are observed in 
WKHDXWKRU¶VVDPSOH)LUVWO\LWKDVEHHQLGHQWLILHGWKDWRIVHFRQGDU\GHDOVDUHEHLQJSDUWLDOO\RU
entirely financed by one of the initial debtors. Secondly, a signiILFDQWLQFUHDVHLQGHEWRUV¶V\QGLFDWLRQ
has also been observed. The latter observation illustrates the confidence banks have in this post first-
round buy-out firm, but also the consideration of a higher risk - due to a larger size, a higher sale price, 
and/or limited growth perspective. 
 
Bonini (2010) found out that when the cost of a leverage buy-out deal measured by debt spread 
and equity contribution, decreases, secondary buy-outs become much more likely. Total debt 
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tendered to the leverage buy-out industry is positively correlated with the increase in secondary 
buy-outs. As to produce portfolio returns, when accessibility to debt at cheaper cost has 
increased, private equity investors have taken advantage of secondary deals. Many investors 
have thus preferred to target firms generating large cash flows, even if growth perspectives 
were limited. Both Kaplan (1989) and Shipper and Smith (1988) argue that tax benefits are 
unlikely to be the entire source of value in management buyouts. 
 
However limitations to the tax shield advantage must be considered. Indeed, Kaplan (1989b) 
and Renneboog et al. (2007) identified a very high correlation between expected tax savings and 
premiums paid by shareholders at the buy-out transaction time. This relation minimises the 
effect of debt and its tax shield, as tax benefits of leverage should be contained in the price paid 
to exiting investors.  
 
 

ǯ	
 
 
Lowenstein (1985) argues that managers have information about the company that is not 
available to other bidders. This may give an information advantage to the management team, 
which will have a competitive lead toward investors when taking next decisions. As managers 
possess such private information, they can purchase the company, invest in subsequent 
financing round at a lower price than the market would ask for. Taking or keeping the firm 
private should beneficiate the management team if they know that the market undervalues the 
firm. Some pernicious arguments consider that, as to gain the most from the transaction, ǯǤǡ
the possibility that managers deliberately undervalue corporate assets before the buy-out 
(Palepu 1990). Weir et al. (2005) identified undervaluation as a major rationale for going 
private.  
 
In the case of secondary buy-outs, theory states it is unlikely that first-financing round private 
equity investors would discount transaction price from its fair market value. In this situation, 
second-financing round private equity investors, as well as the remaining management team, 
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would not beneficiate from an undervaluation advantage. Considering that most management 
teams remain, either undervaluation exist, either cash-flow growth and value creation 
perspectives are granted to the new buy-out. Even if the management team does not take 
responsibilities or share in subsequent financing round, it does not mean that the company is 
over priced. Managers are probably exiting for personal motives. Growth opportunities should 
still be available, assuming that the management team in place became risk averse protecting 
the wealth they have created. Such situation frees growth opportunities for risk taker such as 
the second-tier management team (Wright, Hoskisson, Busenitz, & Dial, 2001) 
 
Considering the past years economic downturn, most firms have been undervalued by the 
market which should have been a major motive for managers to keep the firm private as to 
beneficiate from these massive under pricing. However limited access to debt financing have 
outbalanced this presupposed motive. 
 
*** 
 
While the common belief consider that first-round buy-  ǲǳ    
firms, leaving no room for performance increase to secondary buy-outs, our explanations of buy-
outs motives suggest that performance could still be improved. Indeed, some of the well-known 
motives to leverage buy-out deals are still present and probably, most of the time, stronger. 
Increased debt leverage, concentrated equity, increased managerial ownership and managerial 
information advantage, are factors which should pull performance and return up. In addition, 
early private equity funds exits from buy-outs, due to timing pressure created by closed-end 
funds limited life expectancy, allow investors to believe in secondary buy-outs performance and 
return increase potential.  
 
To my knowledge, Bonini (2010) is, as to date, the only academic article comparing secondary 
buy-outs performance to their first-round buy-out. Through his data analysis of 111 European 
multiple leveraged acquisitions in the 1999- ? ? ? ? ǡ    ǲ -
outs do not show statistically significant evidence of incremental performance but do generate 
large and significant jumps in leverage and cash squeeze-ǳǤ    
considers first and second buy-outs performance from a year before to a year after each of the 
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two transactions. These short windows should not be able to recount the all performance 
improvement of buy-out rounds. Indeed, a year post transaction seems quite short for 
management to take the entire advantage of the new structure. For example, if the taxes shield 
creation has an influence over profits Ȃ if not offset via transaction premiums, such influence 
should remain couple of years considering the significance of debt. In addition, performance 
improvement through buy-outs incentives and financial structure might be more sudden after 
the first round of financing than after subsequent rounds. Indeed, as these supposed positive 
changes are not new but only stronger for secondary buy-outs, effects may be better spread over 
time or take longer to be observed. 
 
We, in this paper, wish to assess if the first buy-out round does indeed spruced all the 
value from the firm, leaving little room for performance improvement and return to 
secondary buy-outs. Considering the time scale limitation (evolution from a year pre to a year 
post first round and secondary buy-out transactions) applied to the only academic analysis on 
the subject (Bonini 2010), we will extend the length of both performance analysis and return 
(we will also consider some additional ratios and compute our change in a different way). 
 
INFLUENCE OF SYNDICATION 
 
To a significant extend, venture capital firms syndicate their investments. This means that two 
or more venture capitalists share their contribution to the financing of the target firm. Resorts to 
syndication are driven by numerous motives which vary from case to case.  
  
The very first obvious motive for syndication is known as the selection hypothesis or improved 
selection, introduced by Lerner (1994) and covered later by Cumming (2006a). This argument, 
developed from Sah and Stiglitz (1986) model of organisational design, states that there 
probably is an advantage in having several venture capitalists evaluating an investment project 
before every financing round. To do so, the lead investor Ȃ usually the first and major investor Ȃ 
select other venture capital investors, which bring additional knowledge and opinions into the 
selection process. Such practices should ensure a better screening of the target from the ǯǡǯǤ 
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However while syndication should reduce agency costs between investees and investors 
through better screening and selection process (Cumming, 2006a; and Lerner, 1994), it also add 
agency cost on syndicated members (Cumming 2005). Indeed the lead investor or the investor 
for whom the investment is the most significant regarding to its funds size has more incentive to 
monitor the target than the other syndicated members. Investors with low incentives might not 
monitor properly the investee Ȃ such reaction is called the free-riding behaviour (Cumming, 
2006b). This attitude of the syndicated members will create tension and will not serve the 
investee to the best. The respective efforts of the syndicated members to monitor will also create 
information asymmetries. These information asymmetries arise especially when the risk of 
agency problems is high, as the lead investor will have a major role in monitoring the firm, 
leaving the other syndicated investors unprotected from incompetent monitoring. To protect 
themselves from such risks, non-lead investors may write contracts granting them from a veto 
power on major decisions. In this situation, all syndicated members must agree the decision. 
When it is evident that syndication creates costs (co-ǡǥȌǡ
Wright (2003) extrapolate to the notion of risk creation. 
 
The determinant feature leading venture capitalist to syndicate is the risk-sharing 
consideration (Lerner, 1994). Whatever the stage of investment, it has been empirically 
demonstrated that, on the European private equity market, financial risk spreading is the key 
motive to syndication (Lockett and Wright, 2001; Manigart et al., 2006). Such risk-sharing policy 
is possible thought portfolio diversification (Markovitz, 1952). Proper diversification lowers the 
variance of return and minimise the risk, while the average return remain the same. While risk-
sharing motive due to risk aversion is considered as the main driver to proceed to syndicate 
investment, it, according to theory, does not influence the rate of returns. However, 
diversification is ǢǯǤ 
 ǡǲ
their specific knowledge and complementary skills as to add more value to the investee ȋǤ  ? ? ? ?Ȍǳȋǡǡǡ  ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
such statement, from the lead investor point of view, the benefit of seeking syndication is that 
the value of the project rises if other venture capitalist become involved (Brander, Amit, 
Antweiler, 2002). Another motive to syndication is the better negotiating power of the syndicate 
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towards both bank and entrepreneurs, which should provide better financial terms to the 
syndicate (Anand and Galetovic, 2000; and Hochberg et al. 2002) 
 
While most empirical analysis found out that syndicated projects have higher rate of returns 
than standalone projects, just like Brander, Amit, Antweiler (2002), no specific study has been 
conduct on a secondary buy-out sample. The argument that challenges this latter statement is 
concerning the size of the investment. Indeed, according to statistics, secondary buy-out deals 
tend to be much larger than average deals, which should influence the decision of the investors. 
According to Jelic   ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯ     ?ǡ ? ? ? -outs during 1980-2004, 
secondary management buy-outs tend to be the largest deals; the mean size of deals being 
£75.24 million in this sample. Consequently, in the case of secondary buy-outs, venture capital 
firms may only resort to syndication due to capital constraints (Brander, Amit, Antweiler, 2002). 
 
We wish to assess the influence of syndication on secondary buy-outs. 
 
INFLUENCE OF PRIVATE EQUITY BACKING 
 
Many firms may not have access to the necessary resources and skills to take advantage of 
growth opportunities, so they look for external actors who could bring them these resources; a 
partnership is set. Quite often the chosen partner is a private equity firm. The usual belief is that ǯ main task will be to monitor the management team via their representation ǯǤǡ
extend venture capital firms, bring an advisory dimension though their human capital 
contribution (Dimon & Shepherd, 2005; Gorman & Shahlman, 1989; Wright 2007). Access to 
their network is also a significant contribution of private equity firms (Ireland et al., 2003; Lee, 
Lee, & Pennings, 2001). However Barney (2002) states that the commonality of such private 
equity role does not create a competitive advantage between private equity backed deals; but 
we are not interested in this dimension. More interesting is the extent to which private equity 
firms can bring value to investees, in consideration on the type of deal. Private equity firm             ǯ
managers (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). The impact of private equity firm experience and 
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intensity of post-buyout involvement of firm performance, therefore, will be contingent on the 
type of buyout transaction (Meuleman, Amess, Wright, Scholes, 2009). This statement 
establishes the possibility of different private equity backing influence on both secondary buy-
out and 1st round buy-out. 
 
There is empirical evidence that the board representation of private equity firm within company 
under investment has a positive effect on private equity backed buy-outs (Thompson and 
Wright, 1995; and Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). Private equity representation on board also 
strengthens governance structure of private equity-backed firms compared to public firms 
(Acharya et al., 2009; Cornelli and Karakas, 2008). Considering the equity stake belonging to the 
private equity firm and their desire to exit the investment within a reasonable time period,            ǯ  Ȃ via their board 
members (Cotter and Peck., 2001; and Cressy, Munari, and Malipiero., 2007). Private equity 
firms usually respect a strict procedure that require them to conduct due diligence on the target. 
This investigation on the firm will provide the private equity firm with a clear picture of the 
financial health and the strategy of the target, which will enable private equity investor to better 
monitor and advice the firm.  
 
We wish to assess the influence private equity backing has on secondary buy-outs, 
compared to first-round buy-outs. As to date, no empirical analysis has been conducted on 
such deals. While private equity backing on first-round buy-outs tends to increase the ǯ ǡ         -outs, 
potentially influencing in a negative way their willingness to monitor and to advice the 
managerial team.  
 
CORRELATION BETWEEN BUY-OUT LENGTH AND ITS SECONDARY BUY-OUT 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Private equity investors, when investing into a firm, are looking to maximise their returns as to 
satisfy their limited partners and take advantage of such performances to raise subsequent 
funds. Considering such return-oriented policy it is evident that private equity firms wish to exit 
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ǯǤǡ
multiples, the higher the price of sale. Following such policy, private equity firm will prefer 
flotation or trade sale exit as, according to market data analysis, latter exits types provide the 
best returns. Secondary buy-outs exit possibility would, in a return oriented perspective, only be 
considered if both flotation and trade sale exits cannot be concretise.  
       ǯ  ǡ      
closed-end fund with a ten-year life expiry. It may, indeed, not always be possible to exit 
iǯǤǯ-of-life deadline and its necessity to exit investments, general partners will most of 
the time, prefer secondary buy-out exits Ȃ if possible Ȃ than to pay penalty fees or exit via 
divesture. Such considerations have definitely contributed to the secondary buy-outs popularity 
within the past decades.  
 
However the impact of such timing issue on secondary buy-outs performance is not evident. We 
are going to assess the influence of the first round buy-out length to the secondary buy-out 
performance. We consider that the usual belief stating that first round buy-ǲǳ
value from the target, leaving no room for performance improvement and return to the 
secondary buy-out is observed. If the exit to secondary buy-out is quick we would believe that              ǯ    Ȃ 
otherwise it would have preferred a flotation or trade sale exit. In such case the initial investors 
would not have had the sufficient time to maximise performance and extract all the value from 
the firm, leaving positive return perspective to the secondary buy-out investors. This would 
introduce a negative relationship between first round buy-out length of time and 
secondary buy-out level of performance. 
 
SMBO EXIT DISTRIBUTION 
 
As previously introduced, private equity firms wish to maximise return, and the preferred exits 
alternatives to realise such prospect is either via flotation or trade sale. As first round buy-out 
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investors exited via a secondary buy-out, secondary buy-out investors could use a tertiary buy-
out alternative if market conditions are not favourable. Other significant exits are divestures. 
 
Like many studies assessing preferred exits from first round buy-outs as to illustrate markets 
trends. We wish to provide similar statistics of secondary buy-outs exits distribution. 
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DATA 
SAMPLE 
 
The list of buy-out deals and their exits, used for analytical analysis in this paper has been kindly 
provided by the CMBOR (Center for management buy-outs research).  Access to such database 
enabled me to identify a total of 6,633 UK secondary buy-outs from 2000 to 2010. Information 
on the type of their first buy-out (BIMBO, buy-out, IBO, private buy-in, public buy-in), their 
vendors, their sources (private/public, UK/foreign origin), their date of deal, some financial 
information on deals (turnover, deal value, EBIT) their date and type of exit (flotation, trade sale, 
subsequent buy-out, receivership). 
 
As to assess the relevance of our hypothesis presented earlier, we had to proceed to a more 
strict selection, as we needed to get some more specific information regarding the deals. Criteria 
such as syndication, private equity backing was indeed not provided for all secondary buy-outs. 
Further to this first step in the selection process, I had to gather all secondary buy-out deals that 
occurred during the 2000-2009 period, as it was this period I was interested in for my analysis Ȃ 
I will explain why later on. Bearing in mind that I did not only want to get my analysis ratios for 
the secondary buy-out period and the initial buy-out period, but also for the pre-initial buy-out 
period when possible, I had to gather information from two different list provided by the 
CMBOR. I indeed have been given a list of secondary buy-outs with their date of secondary buy-
out deal and date of secondary buy-out exit; while the other list gave the date of initial buy-out 
transaction as well as the date of the secondary buy-out transaction Ȃ being the exit of this initial 
buy-out. Once I gathered all this data together, I looked into the FAME database as to get the 
firms accounting information. However, here again I had to narrow my sample, as I have not 
been able to locate all firms into the database. There are some well-known reasons explaining 
why I have not been able to find all these firms within FAME. The first of them would be the non-
recording of small firms in such database. The second reason I invoke is the quite often-
observed lack of accounting information of a firm during a year or two, which impedes a clear ǯǤǡ-two reasons, 
some small and medium UK private firms are allowed to only report abridged accounts.  
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All these criteria requirements and these faced limitations have narrowed my sample to 108 
secondary buy-outs deals for which I had both secondary buy-outs transaction and exit date; for 
49 of them I also have been able to get their initial buy-out transaction deal. 
 
If I only selected secondary buy-out transactions settled thought the 2000-2009 period, it is due 
to the unavailability of some data in FAME, as for many of deals occurring previously to 2000, 
accounting data are classified within archives. However, omitting some possible significance 
limitations due to the limited size of the sample, these restrictions did not arm my analysis. 
Indeed, couples of academics have identified an evolution within the motives to secondary buy-
outs. Perceptions of secondary buy-out as an exit alternative to distressed firms have evolved 
toward a more enhancing exit alternative. We, earlier in this paper, have shown that secondary 
buy-outs became much more popular within the past two decades, providing satisfying rate of 
returns, enabled through increased leverage and some other motives we wish to demonstrate. 
Thus this focus on the past decade secondary buy-outs, should serve better our hypothesis. In 
aǡǡǯ
and they probably share similar motives. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
In our total of 6,633 secondary buy-outs occurred between 2000 and August 2010, only 26.46% 
have exited, leaving a total 4,878 non-exited secondary buy-outs. It is quite interesting to note 
that 51% and 65% of these not yet exited investments took place before 2005 and 2006 
respectively. Meaning that at least 49% and 35% of these secondary buy-outs already have 
respective length of life superior to 62 and 50 months. Through our 1,755 exited secondary buy-
outs, trade sales, with a total of 669 transactions for 38.12%, have been the most popular exit. 
Then come receiverships with 37.78% of the exits alternatives, followed by 21.54% of 
subsequent buy-out rounds Ȃ being tertiary buy-outs in our case Ȃ and a final 2.56% of 
companies being introduced on stock exchanges.  
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Table 1.1: Secondary buy-outs exits characteristics 
 
 
While trade sales are the moǡ  ǲǳ 
according to a profit before interests and taxes on deal value ratio. Indeed, trade sale investors 
pay 9.96 times the secondary buy-out profit before interests and taxes (PBIT), while investors in 
firms to be quoted or firms that will go through a tertiary buy-out respectively pay 12.37 times 
and 25.47 times the PBIT. This last figure raises some interrogations. Indeed it is quite 
surprising that a buy-out deals would be much more expensive that a trade sale or a flotation 
exit, considering that these latter have been identified, and this by many academic papers, as the 
most profitable exits in terms on internal rate of return. We actually presented some of these 
results into our introduction: Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) as well as Jelic and Wright (2009) 
identified the rate of return of the different exit alternatives. The first study treated 321 UK buyouts 
exited between 1995 and 2004 and found out that buy-outs exited though flotation procured an 
internal rate of return of 137%, way ahead of trade sales (23%) and secondary buy-outs (10.5%). 
Jelic and Wright (2009) analysis of UK 1,225 buy-outs during 1980-2004, identified that exited via 
flotation earned 42% and also clearly outperformed trade sale (24%) and secondary management 
buy-outs (23%).  
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Table 1.2: Secondary buy-outs exits characteristics 
 
The tertiary buy-ǯǡ  
gives us a purchase price of 12.11 times the PBIT; a much plausible figure. However, as 
illustrated earlier in this paper, buy-outs present some major motives compared to going on 
public or being bought by a quoted firm. Indeed, firms exiting via a tertiary buy-out would be 
enabled to, once again, take advantage of a large tax shield, generated through greater leverage 
and larger tax-deductible interests payment. Such advantages have been well-identified by 
secondary buy-outs investors, and will, in the same way it has been charged to them in the first 
place, be considered in the transaction price settlement (Kaplan, 1989b; Rennebood et al., 2007). 
According to this theory, it is the high positive correlation between tax savings and premiums 
paid by new investors that pull tertiary buy-outs deal value on PBIT ratio above flotation and 
trade sale. Indeed, tax savings cannot be illustrated by the PBIT figures, as its name indicates. 
Furthermore, flotation and trade sale exits also occur quicker than subsequent buy-out rounds, 
implying less debt repaid, and its influence on price. 
 
Also to be considered is the accounts manipulations prior to buy-outs. Wu (1997) showed that, 
in a surprisingly significant number of buy-outs transactions, managers manipulated the firms 
earning downwards prior to the management buy-out. We effectively have shown that ǯ      -out round to another, to the extent that 
transaction under-  Ǥ   ǯ   
ratio does not make much sense considering the actual losses of firms on average. However, the 
same ratio computed using median, reaches a 13.13 times score, which makes it quite 
comparable to other exit alternatives. Limitations of this ratio have to be considered. Indeed, 
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new investorsǯ motives to purchase firms do not lie in their actual performance, but lie in its 
potential and perspectives of future improvement. Strategic motive for trade sales also is a key 
determinant in the deal value settlement. 
 
While it seems evident, considering their respective internal rate of returns presented by other 
academic research, that firms to be quoted are more expensive than trade sales, it is not from Ǥǡǡǯ ?Ǥ ? ? ?   ǡ   ?Ǥ ? ? ?  ǯ ȋ ?Ǥ ? ?Ȍǯȋ ?Ǥ ? ?ȌǤǡ
book manipulation argument prior to trade sale. This theory, supported by some academics, ǯ
to beneficiate from greater equity valuation. Such book manipulation would be much more 
complicated prior to flotation as stronger regulations bodies screening would be in place.  
 
 
Table 1.3: Secondary buy-outs exits characteristics 
 22 
 
In terms of transactions size, general trends identified from other academics papers are 
observed from our sample. Deal values of flotation are the largest, with a median of £79m, then 
comes tertiary buy-outs (£27.20m,) trade sales (£15.00m) and finally receivership (£5.75m). It 
is also interesting to pay attention to their mean deal values, which are much higher than their 
medians, illustrating the existence of some very large transactions whatever the exit type. ǯǤ ? ? ? ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ
secondary buy-outs exiting through IPO, are the largest in terms of revenues, followed by 
tertiary buy-outs (£26.20m), trade sales (£20.00m) and receiverships (£12.00m).  
 
These statistics show some evolution between the exit trends from first-round buy-outs and 
secondary buy-outs. Indeed, Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) as well as Jelic and Wright (2009) 
rank secondary buy-outs as the largest exit in terms of transaction size. Their respective 
findings, in terms of median deal value for Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) and in terms of 
average deal value for Jelic and Wright (2009), are: secondary buy-out (£26.5m and £139.07m), 
flotation (£23.7m and £74.90m), trade sale (£25.00m and £116.89m), and receiverhip (£6.3m 
and £69.35m). While secondary buy-outs were already, in terms of deal value, the largest exit 
from initial management buy-outs, this tendency is repeated with tertiary buy-out exits. 
 
Ranking in terms of length does not seem to be fundamentally different from observed initial 
buy-outs trends. The quickest exit implemented is flotation with a mean of 29.82 months, 
followed by receiverships (36.98 months), trade sale (41.13 months) and tertiary buy-outs  
(43.56 months). Medians lengths are located pretty close to average lengths, strengthening the 
relevance of these figures. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE RATIOS 
 
Considering data and information availability limitations faced when studying private firms, 
researchers (ie. Jelic and Wright (2009), Bonini (2010)) often opt for accounting based 
performance analysis, as recommended by Barber and Lyon (1996). They indeed studied the 
relevancy of   ǯ      ǡ
statistical tests, and models of expected operating performance. Such accounting based analyses 
are enabled by governments lay down of minimum accounting publication requirements.  
 
Taking in advantage of Bonini (2010) as well as Jelic and Wright (2009), research papers on buy-
outs change in accounting performance; I assessed the best descriptive ratios I would be able to 
compute, and dressed up my own list. This list regroups ratios enabling me to assess different ǯǡǤ 
 
There are 10 ratios regrouped into 6 categories: 
 
Leverage 

ȋ ?ȀǯȌ 
 
Operating efficiency 
Turnover per employee (= Sales / Number of employees) 
Net assets turnover (=Sales / Total assets) 
Return on capital employed (= EBIT / (Total assets Ȃ Current liabilities)) 
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Profitability / Margin ratio 
EBIT margin (=Earnings before interests and taxes / Sales) 
Profit margin (= Net income / Sales) 
 
Return on investment 
Return on assets (= Net income / Total assets) 
ǯȋ ?ȀǯȌ 
 
Liquidity 
Current ratio (= Current assets / Liabilities) 
 
Solvency 
Solvency ratio (= (Net income + Depreciation) / Total liabilities) 
 
MEASURE COMPARISONS AND ITS ROBUSTNESS 
 
As I mentioned earlier, the sample since may have an impact of results significance. However a 
sample size of 108 transactions seems similar to the sample size of many academics papers 
published on similar subject. It has to be considered that these deals are settled on private firms 
with limited obligation to communicate its financial accounts and definitely no obligation to 
publish its transaction price. In addition, couples of our results are statistical significant 
according to t-test or p-value obtained on change in means and regression. To this extent, our 
sample size seems big enough to guarantee some relevant results. 
 
While I earlier explained issues faced using FAME, my focus on secondary buy-out deals occurring 
ZLWKLQ WKH ODVW GHFDGH LV D IDFWRU RI UREXVWQHVV E\ LWVHOI DV LQYHVWRU¶V PRWLYHV ZRXOG SUREDEO\ EH
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similar. 
 
$VWRLQFUHDVHWKHUREXVWQHVVRIP\UHVXOWV,GLGQRWVWXG\WKHUDWLRV¶FKange, from a year to another, 
but I computed their average score on a given period, and then compared them. For example, as to 
compare the change in return on assets of a firm before its secondary buy-out transaction to after this 
transaction, I computed both returns on assets average figures for a given number of years prior and 
post transaction. While most studies only define a specific number of years pre and post transaction 
date for which they compute their ratios, I wanted to consider the all secondary buy-out average score.  
 
This enabled me to identify change pre and post transaction in a more accurate and rigorous way. In 
addition, such way to proceed is also consistent to Barber and Lyon (1996) findings, emphasising the 
necessity to scrutinise firmV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH IRU VHYHUDO \HDUV IROORZLQJ DQ HYHQW WUDQVDFWLRQV LQ RXU
case).  
 
Averaged performance indicator 
 
Avg. R = >(12 ± 0G5W5W«0H-1)*Rt+n@ / >(n-1)*12 + (12-Md) + (Me-1)@ 
 
Where Md LVWKHPRQWK¶VQXPEHUZKHQWKHGHDORFFXUVRt is the ratio figure on year t, and Me is the 
PRQWK¶VQXPEHUZKHQ WKHEX\-out exit takes place. Using such formula enables me to compute, in 
quite an accurate way, the ratio change throughout the buy-out period. Many academics studies do not 
consider the year of the deal into their computations, as it includes both pre and post buy-out phases. 
:KLOHWKHVHFRQFHUQVDUHWRWDOO\MXVWLILDEOH,SUHIHUWRZHLJKWWKH\HDU¶VUDWLRWRWKHQXPEHURIPRQWKV
for both the pre and post buy-out periods, bearing in mind that some significant changes could take 
place very quickly after the change in ownership occurred. However, joining most academics 
UHOXFWDQFHWRLQFOXGHWKHWUDQVDFWLRQ\HDU¶VUDWLRLQWRWKHLUDQDO\VLV,GRQRWLQFOXGHWKHWUDQVDFWLRQ¶V
month into mine, as I would not been able to weight it properly within my average computation. If it is 
the pre-first buy-out or post-secondary buy-out period, accounting data provided through FAME are 
given starting on January or ending in December; thus for such periods I respectively do not need to 
subtract the beginning of ending month of the period. 
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For instance, lets consider an initial buy-out settled in February 2002 and exited through a secondary 
buy-out in October 2006, and take into account that FAME would provide ILUP¶V DFFRXQWLQJ GDWD
from 2000 to 2009. Firstly I would establish average pre-first buy-out ratio for the 13-month period 
(January 2000 to January 2002), then compute the change with the average ratio on the 55-month of 
initial buy-out (March 2002 to September 2006), and finally compare the initial buy-out period to the 
average ratio on the 37-month secondary buy-out period (December 2006 to December 2009). As 
balance sheet and income statement figures are given for year-end, and transactions are settled 
WKURXJK RXW WKH \HDU , FRPSXWHG P\ DYHUDJH UDWLRZHLJKWLQJ HDFK ILQDQFLDO \HDU¶V VFRUH RQ WKHLU
number of months within the year. The average ratio computation of the secondary buy-out described 
previously would be: 
 
Avg. R = >(12 ± 2)*R2002 + 12*R2003 + «-1)*R2006@ / >(4-1)*12 + (12-2) + (10-1)@ 
 
Considering that accounting ratios comparisons are performed between different years through 
this past decade, adjustment of these ratios should be computed as to guarantee the relevancy of 
results obtained. If these adjustments do not entirely guarantee such relevancy, they at least 
strengthen the accounting ratios pertinence and witness of results obtained in a more rigorous 
manner.  
 
To do so, while interested in the comparison of ratios, I first computed abnormal percentage 
averaged performance indicator. Abnormal means that I am interested in assessing the    ǯ      Ǥ   ǡ ǯǯǯǤǡ
we measure, how differently our firm will differ from its peers.  
 
Abnormal percentage averaged performance indicator 
 
%A. Avg. R i;s = (Avg. R i ± Avg. R s ) / Avg. R s 
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Where, for a defined period, %A. Avg. R i ;s is the abnormal percentage averaged ratio of firm i 
operating in sector s, Avg. R LVWKHSHULRG¶VDYHUDJHd ratio for firm i, operating in the sector s, and Avg. 
R s is the averaged ratio based on the median for industry s. This ratio gives me the nominal difference 
between the buy-out firms within the sample and their respective industry peers. 
 
Once I have computed these differences for the two periods into consideration (i.e. pre and post 
secondary buy-out), I want to express the change - from before to after the event ± in percentage. I, 
consequently, apply the following formula: 
  
Change in Abnormal averaged performance indicator 
 
'% A. Avg. R i;s = (1 + A. Avg. R i;s post ± A. Avg. R i;s pre ) / (1+ A. Avg. R i;s pre) 
 
where '% A. Avg. R i;s is the change in abnormal averaged ratio for firm i operating in the industry s, 
, A. Avg. R i ;s post is the post transaction abnormal percentage averaged ratio of firm i operating in 
sector s, and A. Avg. R i ;s pre is the pre transaction abnormal percentage averaged ratio of firm i 
operating in sector s. 
 
Such computations, according to Barber and Lyon (1996) recommendations, would enable me to 
rigorously ± and this in a certain extent - FRPSDUHP\ VDPSOH¶V UDWLRV HYROXWLRQ LQ UHJDUGV WR WKHLU
industry peers.  
 
As to compute abnormal results, I had to gather HDFKILUP¶V6HFWRU,GHQWLILFDWLRQ&RGH6,&RIP\
sample.  SIC is a four-digit number assigned to every firm as to classify them within the industries 
they belong to. The first digit represents the broader types of industries, the second digit divide the 
each first digit industries into smaller categories, and so on. As to get a four-digit SIC, representing a 
small or less small group of industry peers. 
 
 
 28 
Once I collected all SIC of the firms belonging to my sample I realise that FAME would only provide 
PH ZLWK HYHU\ 6,& QXPEHU WUHQGV IRU WKH  RU  \HDUV SULRU WR WRGD\¶V GDWH ,W ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ
impossible and too restrictive to study secondary buy-out deal during such short window. In addition, 
changes would not have had time to be appropriately led. However I realised through my readings that 
many academics researchers gathered these industries trends through the Compustat database. 
Unfortunately I was not able to get access to such database. I tried to get a free trial but I received no 
update regarding my request. I finally realised that I could compute my own industries average ratios, 
as FAME enabled me to search via SIC. Considering the high number of different four-digit SIC 
represented within my sample,GHFLGHGWRUHJURXSP\VDPSOH¶VILUPVXQGHUWKHLUtwo-digit SIC, as it 
saves some time and still guarantee a rigorous process. In addition some 4-digits SIC groups are quite 
small, minimising the relevancy of the adjustment. I had a total of 24 different SIC numbers 
WKURXJKRXW WKH  ILUPV FRQVWLWXWLQJ P\ ILQDO VDPSOH 2QFH H[WUDFWHG HYHU\ ILUPV¶ UDWLRV
corresponding to the SIC group, I computed their median ratios for every year of the 2000-2009 
period. I then have been able to calculate the weighted (in terms of months) average of the SIC group 
median value for the period I was interested in (pre/post initial/secondary buy-out) (see averaged 
performance indicator I the above). 
 
To ensure the reliability of my statistical analysis, I also performed some data clearing and 
significance tests. It has been illustrated, and this through many statistical analyses, that extreme 
observations usually biased results obtained in an analytical way. To avoid such bias, I proceeded to 
some data clearing implementing a 90% Winsorisation. This test sets the 5% lowest observations of a 
category to its 5
th
 percentile value and the 5% highest value to its 95
th
 percentile value. While many 
statistical analysis just proceed to a data trimming, which simply consists in discarding the extreme 
observations, Winsorising is a much more rigorous test in the way that it reduces the impact of 
extreme observations, but do not discard it.  Results obtained are more reliable but still show, to a 
certain extent, the all sample values. Statistical analyses usually implement a 99% Winsorising, but 
considering the limited size of my sample ± 108 observations, this would imply very limited flattening 
of extreme observations. 
 
Once that my sample was flatten as to avoid extreme variable bias on my results, I have been able to 
compute both my Abnormal percentage averaged performance indicator and Change in Abnormal 
averaged performance indicator. However, significance tests must be ran as to proceed in a rigorous 
univariate analysis on performance measures. These tests will assess to what extent Abnormal 
percentage averaged performance indicator changes from the pre-initial buy-out transaction to the 
post-initial buy-out transaction period. It will assess significance of the change between the pre-
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secondary buy-out transactions to the post-secondary buy-out transaction period, using a t-test. It 
EDVLFDOO\ FRQVLVWV LQ PHDVXULQJ WKH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WZR JURXSV¶ PHDQV LQ UHJDUGV WR WKHLU
respective variability. Value obtained through the t-test (the t-value) enables me to state whether the 
difference between pre and post event groups is not likely to have been obtained by chance finding. As 
we cannot say whether our sample distribution in normally distributed or not, t-test might not always 
be the adequate significance test measurement, due to its normal distribution requirements. To avoid 
this issue, we also ran a Wilcoxon signed ranked test. For both these tests, the null hypothesis is that 
change from pre and post buy-out transaction is null. In other words, means are equal, so not 
statistically significant. 
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UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
 
The purpose of this analysis is to assess impacts secondary buy-outs motives, presented in the 
literature review, have on secondary buy-out performance. As well as their influences on 
performance changes from first round buy-outs to secondary buy-outs. Additional motives - in 
regards initial buy-outs - brought through change in ownership structure include resort to 
increased leverage, alignment of interest through increased managerial ownership as well as 
managerial informational advantage. Our analysis results are displayed into six ratio categories. 
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Table 2: Summary of abnormal percentage averaged performance indicators and changes in abnormal averaged performance indicators 
This table represents our sample abnormal percentage averaged ratios and changes in abnormal averaged ratios (see methodology section for formula Ȍǣǲǳȋd buy-Ȍǡǲǳȋ-Ȍǲǳȋ
buy-out period). Performance indicators regroup 7 categories including 10 ratios (see methodology section for additional details) Ǥ ǲǳ    
observations for each category. 
Robustness tests (see methodology section for additional details): a 90% Winsorisation have been implemented on the sample as to lower extreme observations 
impacts. Two statistical significance tests are run on the results; a t-test and a Wilcoxon ȋȌǤǲǳǯǤ 
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LEVERAGE 
     ǯ        ǡ   
average gearing for the three different ownership periods. Gearing ratio is the long-term debt of      ǯ  Ǥ        ǯ ǯ ǯǤ 
the use of leverage as a major motive to management buy-out, as it enables the management 
team to finance additional activities and to take advantage of more growth opportunities in the 
same time. In addition, financing activities through debt is cheaper that through equity; in 
particular thanks to the creation of the tax shield. I, in the literature review, have recounted 
findings of academics, identifying an even greater use of leverage from first round buy-out to 
secondary buy-out. 
 
Lets consider for the univariate analysis, that all outside equity investors are private equity 
firms Ȃ I will make the difference later in the multivariate analysis. It is evident that private 
equity investors select under leverage firms  Ȃ (-6.02%) in comparison to their industry peers Ȃ 
as to proceed to a first-round buy-out. Change through first buy-out corroborates usual samples 
observations, as buy- ǯ       ? ? ?Ǥ ?  ?ǡ  
116.41% positive change. Analysis of secondary buy-out confirms the increase use of leverage 
from first round buy-out, as I observed a positive 11.38% change. From our sample, secondary 
buy-outs outperform their industry peers by 126.56%. All these results are statistically 
significant considering the t-test values. 
 
Such observations strengthen the argument that private equity investors take advantage of 
increased leverage enabled through secondary buy-outs. The analysis of my other ratios may 
identify to what extent such capital structure will reward investors. 
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OPERATION EFFICIENCY 
 
I selected the turnover per employee ratio as my first measure of operating efficiency. This 
ratio does not provide any figure on the actual return, but it highlights the effectiveness of the ǯ       ǯ r. It also gives some indication on the    Ǯ  Ǥ
sector recourse more to machinery as to generate its production and turnover, and some rely ǯskills, an under performance in this ratio would be penalising for  ǯ  Ǥ         
employee force, breeding some unnecessary costs. 
 
In respect to my analysis results, it seems that private equity investors select firms with 
turnover per employee 4.31% above their industry counterparts. Such conscious selection 
tendency testifies of a willingness to acquire firms already more efficient that their industry 
peers. Change through the first buy-out are significant, with the ratio increasing by 8.78% to 
reach a 13.47% over performance compared to buy-outs industry peers. Management team in 
charge has already succeeded to improve the turnover per employee score. It is not always clear 
whether buy-ǯǤǡ
as management has been able to lead more project thanks to the use of leverage, however, in 
many other buy-out cases, gains are not observable in terms of volumes, but in terms of 
efficiency and returns. The managerial team will proceed to the withdraw from the less 
profitable activities or proceed to some layoff. It is this latter resort that, most of the time, 
should contribute to turnover per employee increase from pre to post first round buy-out 
transaction. In our sample, in terms of operating efficiency, secondary buy-outs over perform ǯ 14.89%. However results obtained from the change between first 
round buy-outs and secondary buy-outs are not significant. Difference between these two 
different ownership structure groups does not seem to be statistically significant. We cannot, 
taking account of the significance test results, conclude in a relevant operating efficiency change 
between first round buy-outs and their secondary buy-outs. 
 
I mentioned in the above paragraph that buy-ǯ
turnover increases, but tend to prefer efficiency and profitability increase. To do so, layoffs, 
withdraw from unprofitable or less profitable activities, and sales of assets are very often 
 34 
conducted. While the first impact has already been partially assessed by the turnover per 
employee ratio, the two remaining effects will, in a way, be observed through the net assets 
turnover ratioǤ    ǡ   ǯ     Ǥ  ǯǤǡȂ in terms of operating efficiency. Some academics have shown that private equity investors 
tend to select over performing and more efficiency target, compared to their counterparts. While 
this statement was corroborated by our employee turnover ratio value, it is in not by our net 
assets turnover figure - as it shows a non-significant increase.  
However buy-out over-performance improvements are observed with a significant manner. A 
14.53% net assets turnover increase is experienced from pre-first round to post-first round buy-
out transaction, reaching a 15.78% over-performance of first round buy-out compared to their 
industry peers. In regards to the secondary buy-outs effects, data analysis does not support an 
operating efficiency influence. Indeed, a 5.85% decrease takes place following the change of 
ownership structure. However, secondary buy-out firms still over-perform their industry peers 
by 9.01%. 
 
I included another ratio within the operating efficiency measures: the Return on capital 
employed. This ratio is computed with the earning before interest and taxes, divided by the       Ǥ        ǯ         ǯ Ǥ 
actually seems from the pre-initial buy-out displayed figure (-2.03%), that the return on capital 
ratio is not corroborating the argument that private equity investors are selecting over-
performing targets. However such result is not statistically significant. Though a significant 
75.95% increase between pre and post initial buy-out transaction is observed, highlighting the 
positive effects buy-out structure has on return on capital employed. Both first round buy-outs 
and secondary buy-outs significantly outperform their industry peers after their respective 
change in ownership. Their respective returns on capital employed are 72.38% and 41.49% 
above their sectors. Secondary buy-outs structures do not enable an increase in industry over-
performance in regards to the latter ratio. In truth, return on capital employed over-
performance decreases by 17.92% from a buy-out stage to another. It is noteworthy to mention 
that secondary buy-outs still largely over-perform their counterparts. 
 
 35 
Through this three-performance ratios analysis - turnover per employee, net assets turnover, as 
well as the return on capital employed Ȃ we have no statistically significant results that would 
allow us to state that secondary buy-outs lead to an increase in performance efficiency 
compared to their first buy-out round. Considering both net assets turnover and return on 
capital employed analysis, it actually seems that the opposite evolution is supported.  
 
Compared to their first buy-out round, secondary buy-outs seem to have a negative effect on the ǯǤthese firms still, largely and significantly, out-perform their 
industry peers. 
 
PROFITABILITY AND MARGIN RATIO 
 
We have seen previously that secondary buy-ǯǤ
now want to assess if these observations will be recounted by resulting ratios. To do so I will 
first analyse the EBIT margin, being earnings before interests and taxes divided by sales. This               ǯ Ǥ  
expresses the percentage of each currency unit that is left over once every expense Ȃ except 
interests and taxes Ȃ have been paid. Considering the high resort to financial leverage in the buy-
out industry, it is relevant to first assess the impacts such ownership structures will have on ǯ     -financing effect. Our next ratio: profit margin, will 
illustrate the final effect of such ownership structure. Once it was not statistically significant for 
operating efficiency, private equity investors do select industries over-performing firms as buy-
out targets. Indeed, pre-first buy-outs over-perform their sector counterparts by 6.43%. Positive 
effects of first buy-outs are once again observed. Change from pre first buy-out to post first buy-
out transaction is largely positive with a significant 26.43% increase, as first round buy-outs are 
34.56% more profitable that their peers. Changes to secondary buy-outs are, for their part, the 
scene of a significantly decreasing EBIT margin (-4.40%) as they now only out-perform industry 
peers by 28.64%. 
 
The next ratio, Profit margin is meant to measure how much earnings, in terms of percentage 
per currency unit, a firm actually keeps from its sales. Compared to EBIT margin, profit margin 
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takes into ac       ǯ Ǥ    
significant that private equity investor select more profitable firms that the average (+3.02%), 
the new buy-out ownership structure enables a 20.92% gain in profit margin ratio. With 
respective 24.57% and 14.05%, first round buy-outs and secondary buy-outs significantly ǯǤǡ
buy-out to secondary buy-out is negative (-8.35%). 
 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT 
 
My first ratio used to assess return on investment is the return on assets Ȃ obtained by dividing 
net income by total assets. It illustrates how efficiency the managerial team is in using assets as 
to generate earnings. In other words, return on assets express the level of earnings produced 
from the invested capital Ȃ comprising both debt and equity. Considering management buy-outs 
large recourse to debt financing as well as its little concentrated equity, this ratio takes even 
more relevancy in analysing leverage firms. Through our sample analysis, we can support the 
superior selectivity tendency of private equity investors as buy-out selected firms were already 
generating a return on assets superior by 7.04% than their peers. Changes observed after the 
initial buy-outs are very significant and very large (+34.07%), as to reach a 43.51% return on 
assets over-performance compared to peers. Even if secondary buy-outs keep on outperforming 
their industry counterparts (+32.83%), they do not create superior return than their respective 
first round buy-out (-7.44%). 
 
Next ratio we focus on is the   ǯ , also known as the return on 
equityǤ      ǡ   ǯ     
regards to the total equity invested by shareholders. In this ratio we do not consider the effect 
leverage has in financing earnings, but only focus on the very first contribution: equity. This ǯess, in a way, the level of cash 
generated compared to the investment. We know that many investors use discounted cash flows ǤǯǡȂ as 
sale price should be greater. Let remind that private equity investors are much more interested 
in the profit stemmed from the sale of the firm (the exit) that in the dividend they could earn 
considering a high return on equity figure. From our sample analysis, private equity investors 
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seem         ǯ ǡ  
result is not significant. Change from the pre to the post first round buy-out transaction is 
positive and quite significant (+14.96%), identifying the very positive effect of buy-out structure. 
First-round buy-outs over-perform their peers by 18.97%. Such significant over-performance is 
also observable for secondary buy-out firms, nevertheless the change is negative as a significant 
5.46% is identified. 
 
While first round buy-out have positive effects on operating performance and equity returns, we 
identified through our sample analysis that change in ownership structure to secondary buy-
outs had a negative effect on the very same ratios. Results regarding first round buy-out effects 
are consistent with theories and evidences identified by Kaplan (1989a) and Bull (1989). 
 
LIQUIDITY 
 
The following measure Ȃ current ratio -     ǯ Ǥ    
such: current assets over current liabilities, where current assets is the value of all assets 
expected to be converted into cash within a year time and current liabilities is the value of all Ǥǡǯ
serve its debts and obligations in regards to its current assets. According to our sample, private 
investors do not select firms with better liquidity that their peers, but similar; results are not 
significant. We then observe that first round buy-out has a negatiǯǡ
their current ratio is 3.32% lower than their peers, corresponding to a 4.64%. Similar trend 
(6.43% drop) is present when switching to secondary buy-outs, reaching a 9.54% lower current 
ratio than industry peers. These obs        ǯ
payments due to larger leverage. However, considering that we are using average value over the 
all buy-out period, increase in cash generated should balance this trend. Inventories reduction 
proceeded also tend to reduce the liquidity ratio. Drop in the ratio from the pre first buy-out to 
the past first buy-out transaction time is quite small, illustrating the balancing impacts latter 
effects have. With regards to the change between first round buy-outs and secondary buy-outs, 
cash generation is reduced as profit margin can illustrate, and leverage is once again larger, 
demanding more efforts to repay interests. 
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SOLVENCY 
 ǯ-term debts and obligations, ǯ-term obligations. 
As already introduced in the liquidity ratio explanations, interpretation of these two ratios is 
quite tricky. Indeed, two main opposite effects influencing these ratios are observables: the 
increase in interest payments due to leverage and the increase in profit/cash generation through 
buy-outs incentives results. Computation of ratio average over the different ownership structure 
bias the results and their interpretation should be considered with some detachment. In 
accordance with pre first round buy-out firms lower gearing and higher profit margin/return on 
assets, it is logical to observe our sample higher solvency ratio in regards to their industry peers 
(+4.78%). Change in ownership has a negative impact on the solvency ratio score (-21.13% for a 
24.73% decrease) illustrating the large increase in long-term liabilities. Similar decreasing 
pattern (-8.01%) is observed when changing to secondary buy-out, where the solvency ratio 
reaches a 27.45% lower ratio in regards to sector counterparts. Effects of leverage are very well 
observed through this ratio figures, illustrating a riskier situation of firm Ȃ financially speaking. ǲǳing means is stronger in secondary buy-outs than in first 
round buy-outs. 
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MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
Thanks to our univariate anaylisis, we have assessed the change that two different types of buy-
outs generate from their past ownership structure. It seems quite clear that change from first-
round buy-out to secondary buy-      ǯ   Ǥ
However, in regards to their industry peers, secondary buy-outs still display over-performance 
and superior returns. Through this additional analysis we wish to assess the influence some 
buy-out characteristics has on secondary buyout compared to its industry peers. 
 
Variables, this analysis will observe, are impacts first round buy-out length, secondary buy-
out length, private equity backing and syndication have on secondary buy-outs abnormal 
performance (in percentage terms compared to their respective sectors). To do so I ran a linear 
regression with abnormal percentage averaged performance indicator as the dependent variable 
and the four characteristics named earlier, as independent variables. Linear regression is an 
attempt to model the relationship between a dependent variable in regards to some 
independent variables. It should provide a model that measures the influence changes in each of 
the independents variables will have on the dependent one. Robustness of results obtained 
through such process must be measured as to declare change coefficient applied to independent 
variables as significant. If significance is proved, the coefficient allocated to independent 
variables would testify of the influence such characteristics have on the dependent variable; 
relationship evidence would be illustrated. These significance tests are automatically given by 
regression analysis package as they do compute t-test and P-value in the meantime. 
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Table 3: Influence of first buy-out length, secondary buy-out length, private equity backing and syndication in regards to secondary buy-out performance 
indicators 
This table represents the influence first buy-out length, secondary buy-out length, private equity backing and syndication have on secondary buy-out performance 
indicators. These results have been obtained through a linear regression computation. Performance indicators regroup 7 categories including 10 ratios (see ȌǤǲǳǤ 
Robustness tests (see methodology section for additional details): a 90% Winsorisation have been implemented on the sample as to lower extreme observations 
impacts. Statistical significance test is run on the results; a t-test with its P-Ǥǲǳ-value.  
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LENGTH OF FIRST ROUND BUY-OUT 
 
In the literature review I presented private equity investors preference in terms of exits. Indeed, 
its has been observed that flotation and trade sale are respectively the preferred exits 
alternatives from a first round buy-outs; as they provide grater returns. Resort to secondary 
buy-outs exits would only take place if both these possibilities were unconceivable. The major 
trouble faced by private equity investors Ȃ in such situation Ȃ ǯ
expectancy. In addition we have shown that secondary buy-outs tend to under perform their 
first round buy out. My theory is that private equity investors would only proceed to a change in 
ownership structure Ȃ creating a secondary buy-out Ȃ if they face timing issue. In such case they 
would not have the necessary time to extract all value from secondary buy-outs, leaving good 
prospects for the new buy-out round. 
 
Through my analysis, it seems that the first buy-out length is significantly and negatively 
correlated to the gearing ratio. The longer this first round, the smaller the leverage in 
comparison to industry peers. Short first round buy-outs must probably be better perceived by 
debtors and be allowed a greater resort to debt financing. However, do leverage advantages 
improve performance and return? 
 
In terms of operating efficiency results, the only ratio first round buy-out length statically 
influence is the return on capital employed. A negative relationship is identified. Influence on 
others operating ratio are similar but not significant. Regarding the profitability ratios similar 
patterns are observed but none of the results are significant. Logically these patterns are 
observed on the return on investment ratios. However only the return on assets coefficient is 
significant. In regards to liquidity, first round buy-out length also have a negative impact on 
secondary buy-outs current ratio figure. Nevertheless, secondary buy-outs current ratios are 
below industry peers averages Ȃ switching such negative influence into a positive. The longer 
the first round buy-out, the lower the secondary buy-out current ratio. This illustrates the fact 
that first round buy-ǯǡ
this trend keeps on in secondary buy-outs Ȃ especially considering the increased leverage. The 
significant negative influence on solvency ratio corroborates this theory. 
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After results observation, but with some caution in regards to the limited results obtained, we 
could identify the negative influence first round buy-out length has on secondary buy-out over-
performance of industry peers. These results introduce the possibility that first round buy-out 
investors only exit via secondary buy-out due to the timing issue. More value remains to extract 
from short life first round buy-outs. 
 
LENGTH OF SECONDARY BUY-OUT 
 
It would actually seem quite logical that the longer the secondary buy-ǡ   ǯ
over-performance compared to industry peers. Indeed, buy-out structure has been identified as 
having a positive impact of firmǯǤ
to implement and take advantage of these mechanisms, the better results should be. However it 
has been observed that exits through flotation and trade sale Ȃ the more profitable ones Ȃ tend 
to occur quite quickly, which would imply that these firms are performing better. Nevertheless, 
such firms usually still have large amount of debt and little cash generation power; the all value 
remains in the growth potential Ȃ or strategic advantage for some trade sales. In such case, 
longer buy-out life should enable these performances increase Ȃ to a certain extent because if 
the buy-out is too long, it may witness of some improvement limitations. 
 
As per my analysis observation, only half of my ratios show statistical influence. Effect of 
leverage is not significant, but a negative influence would be observable; confidence of debtors 
might decrease with time. I terms of operating efficiency, both turnover per employee and net 
assets turnover display the positive impact secondary buy-out length has on their performance. 
The EBIT margin, of the profitability category also shows significant positive influence. Finally, a 
negative relationship is identified between secondary buy-out length and both their liquidity 
and solvency ratios. The longer the buy-out, the more current ratios and solvency ratio are 
minimised due to increase in debt and interest repayments. 
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Indeed, the more time allowed for buy-out mechanisms implementation, the greater operating 
performance and profitability improvements. However our results are quite restrictive to few 
ratios and impacts amplitude is not easy to measure. 
 
PRIVATE EQUITY BACKING 
 
Many papers illustrated the positive influence private equity backing has on buy-outs 
performance, profitability and returns, but I wanted to check if these effects remain present in 
secondary buy-outs. Through their presence on board, private equity investors monitor 
managers, advice them and also implement new governance structure. Considering the increase 
in managerial team ownership to the detriment of private equity investors, the latter might 
consider to reduce their monitoring lowering performance and returns. However, managers 
self-monitoring should balance the situation. 
 
As per my analysis results (21 non-private equity backed firms out of 108 firms), secondary buy-
outs private equity monitoring effects are consistent to first buy-out effects. Indeed, private 
equity backing has a significant positive influence on leverage ratio (gearing), operating 
efficiency ratios (turnover per employee, net assets turnover, return on capital employed), 
profitability ratio (EBIT margin) and return on investment ratios (return on assets, return of ǯȌǤot statistically significant; it however 
seems to be positive. Statistically significant negative impact on both liquidity and solvency 
measures highlights greater liabilities and interest repayments due to higher private equity 
resort in leverage. These investors are also known to largely reduce stocks. Noteworthy is that ǯǤ 
 
SYNDICATION 
 
Considering the larger size of secondary buy-outs (Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007, as well as 
Jelic and Wright, 2009), resort to syndication have for investors, been a way to finance larger 
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deals and diversify their portfolio to a greater extent. It also enables better screening and 
selection process (Cumming, 2006a; and Lerner, 1994). In addition such diversification reduces 
cost of monitoring as - according to the free riding behaviour hypothesis (Cumming, 2006b) - 
minority investors tend not to actively participate into monitoring, leaving the lead investor as 
only supervisor. However such behaviour reduces the effect of complementarities between 
syndicated members. Furthermore, syndication usually implies agency costs that may offset 
their previously mentioned advantages. 
 
From my sample analysis (31 syndicated deals out of 108), we can see the positive effect 
syndication   ǯ       ǡ    
significant increase. However, syndication positive effects on performance and return indicator 
are not evident. Some measures of operating efficiencies (turnover per employee and return on 
capital employed) show a significant positive relationship with syndication Ȃ probably due to 
increased leverage. Effects on EBIT margin are also significantly positive. However, other 
profitability of return on investment ratios do not illustrates such positive relationships.  
 
While syndication had a positive effect on performance, returns are not affected, probably due to 
agency costs offsetting the obvious advantages of syndication. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Throughout practical and academic research conducted during the 80s and 90s Ȃ corresponding 
to the first wave of buy-outs Ȃ a good understanding of buy-outs motives and mechanisms has 
been developed. Exits from such ownership structures present different alternatives. While in 
past decades, secondary buy-outs were considered an exit opportunity to distressed first round 
buy-outs, such perceptions have evolved. In the last decade, resorts to secondary buy-outs were 
much more frequent, creating a true enthusiasm towards this new exit alternative. Many 
interrogations were raised on new determinants to such ownership structure; however the 
understanding of secondary buy-outs motives is still limited. 
 
Considering motives to first round buy-outs, I assessed to what extent these advantages evolved 
throughout the change in ownership structure. Principal identified motive to buy-out deals is the 
resort to leverage, using limited ownership and large level of debt to finance firms. Governance 
structures implemented through private equity monitoring and the managerial team alignment 
of interests have been identified as the key mechanism to performance and return improvement. 
In addition, while private equity investors usually change through the change in ownership, 
managers tend to remain in the firm, especially in view of managerial team informational 
advantage on the fair value of the firm. While all these mechanisms Ȃ which contributed to buy-
outs success Ȃ remain and often take a greater dimension in secondary buy-ǡ ǯ
performance and returns should increase from first round buy-outs to secondary buy-outs. 
However, the usual belief consider that investors from the first round buy-ǲǳ
value from the firm, leaving limited performance and return improvement perspective to 
subsequent buy-out round. 
 
I attempted to challenge this later argument through my sample analysis. From a 6,633 UK 
secondary buy-outs sample occurring between 2000 and August 2010, I have selected Ȃ bearing 
in mind issues faced during that process Ȃ a total of 108 exited secondary buy-outs (2000-2009 
period). While first round buy-outs effects are once again verified through this analysis, I have 
not been able to illustrate a positive change in operating performance, profitability or return on 
investment from secondary buy-outs compared to their first round buy-outs figures. These 
ratios are actually significantly and negatively impacted. In regards to the secondary buy-outs 
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motives previously enumerated, the only mentioned mechanisms evolving as predicted is an 
increaseǡǯǤResults 
from this analysis illustrate the inefficiency of secondary buy-outs increased motives in regards 
to their respective first round buy-outs. Analysis of my sample actually brought greater support 
to the statement illustrating how much first round buy-out investors drain all the value from the 
firm, leaving limited performance and return improvement perspective to secondary buy-out 
round. Noteworthy is the strong superior operating performance, profitability and return on 
investment secondary buy-outs still display on their industry peers. 
 
Considering these negative changes in performance indicators due to the change in ownership, I 
wanted to verify that well-know positive effects of private equity backing and syndication 
remain in subsequent buy-outs. To do so I ran a linear regression assessing the influence such 
characteristics have on secondary buy-outs performance indicators in regards to their industry 
peers. While effects remain strongly positive for private equity backing due to its superior 
governance implemented through monitoring, effects of syndication are limited Ȃ introducing 
the belief that superior screening is offset by agency costs. In addition, both private equity 
backing and syndication enable a greater resort to debt financing. Length of first round buy-outs 
was also assessed. While results are limited, first round buy-out length seems to negatively 
impact secondary buy-out performance. Supporting my belief Ȃ to a limited extend Ȃ that the 
shorter the first round buy-out the greater the improvement perspective left to a subsequent 
buy-out. This is consistent to the belief that first round buy-outs investors would only exit 
through secondary buy-outs if neither flotation nor trade sale are possible Ȃ coherently with the 
return-oriented behaviour. Finally, relationship between secondary buy-outs length and their 
respective performance indicator results is also limited to some positive influence. I identified 
that the more time allowed for secondary buy-out mechanisms implementation, the greater 
operating performance and profitability improvements.  
 
While my observations from the univariate analysis are very satisfying, relationships identified 
through the multivariate analysis are, in some ways, limited. Although change from first round 
buy-out to secondary buy-outs only showed negative impacts on operating performance, 
profitability and return on investments, illustrating the limited effects of secondary buy-outs 
improved motives, it appears that secondary buy-outs still outperform industry peers in regards 
to the performance indicators mentioned earlier. Considering such over-performance, following 
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researches could assess in greater details to what extent secondary buy-outs are a satisfying 
investment opportunity Ȃ they obviously are less satisfying that first round buy-outs. 
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